Expert panels with selective investigation

DOI10.1515/bejte-2021-0010OpenAlexW3173532678MaRDI QIDQ2690347

Huanxing Yang, Qiang Gong

Publication date: 16 March 2023

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0010

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosurepanel designmultiple aspectsselective investigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Competitive cheap talk
• Strategic argumentation
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Balance of opinions in expert panels
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• A Simple Model of Voice
• A Model of Expertise
• Cheap Talk and Editorial Control
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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