Expert panels with selective investigation

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2021-0010MaRDI QIDQ2690347zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qiang Gong, Huanxing Yang

Publication date 16 March 2023

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0010

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosuremultiple aspectspanel designselective investigation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Balance of opinions in expert panels
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Cites work

• A model of expertise
• A simple model of voice
• Balance of opinions in expert panels
• Cheap talk and editorial control
• Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
• Competitive cheap talk
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Strategic argumentation
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion

Cited in

(3)

• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Balance of opinions in expert panels
• The wisdom of collective grading and the effects of epistemic and semantic diversity

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