Equilibrium informativeness in veto games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.11.010MaRDI QIDQ1753277zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dmitry Lubensky, Eric Schmidbauer

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.010

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talknon-compliancevetophysician-induced demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Veto-based delegation
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025100 (Why is no real title available?)
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Optimal Delegation
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Veto-based delegation

Cited in

(2)

• Veto-based delegation
• A dynamic multi-player bargaining game with veto players

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