Dynamic expert incentives in teams

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.10.005zbMATH Open1458.91070OpenAlexW3099268097MaRDI QIDQ1995457FDOQ1995457

Authors: Tsz-Ning Wong, Lily Ling Yang 

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.005

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zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionBayesian learningpersuasionfree-ridingvoluntary disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
• Reputation for Quality
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• Breakdowns
• Career concerns with exponential learning

Cited In (9)

• Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols
• Uncertainty-driven cooperation
• Independent versus collective expertise
• Prevention of herding by experts
• Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
• Sorting expertise
• Brief announcement: Towards an abstract model of user retention dynamics

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