Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.

DOI10.1006/GAME.2000.0824MaRDI QIDQ5954062zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

Publication date 15 October 2002

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/389695f022b0a6b55d840372f9d7dcca8440a82e, http://depot.erudit.org/id/000688dd

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Recommendations

• Argumentation in multi-issue debates
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Credible debate equilibria
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Rational Debate and One-Dimensional Conflict*
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?

Cited in

(32)

• Argumentation in artificial intelligence
• Coordination and learning with a partial language
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games
• Credible debate equilibria
• Efficient communication and indexicality
• Team persuasion
• The order of presentation in trials: plaintive plaintiffs
• Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
• Message exchange games in strategic contexts
• A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation
• State of the debate contingent arguments
• How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
• Argumentation in multi-issue debates
• Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: a calibration exercise
• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
• When do simple policies win?
• Implementation with partial provability
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• A conversational war of attrition
• Implementation with evidence
• The complexity of debate checking
• EFFECTIVE PERSUASION
• Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization
• Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion
• Strategic argumentation
• Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence
• United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo
• Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games
• Language constraints in multi-sender communication games
• Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests

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