The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure

DOI10.2307/2937794MaRDI QIDQ3471808zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael J. Fishman, Kathleen M. Hagerty

Publication date 1990

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2937794

zbMATH Keywords

persuasion gameprivate information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mathematical economics (91B99)

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• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure
• Disclosure with unknown expertise
• Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Implementation with partial provability
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• Disclosure and choice
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Rules with discretion and local information
• The interval structure of optimal disclosure
• On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance
• Strategic environmental disclosure: evidence from the DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas registry
• Debates and decisions: On a rationale of argumentation rules.
• Verifiable disclosure
• Data disclosure limitation as a decision problem
• Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion

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