The interval structure of optimal disclosure
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(26)- Learning from like-minded people
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion
- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
- Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
- Guiding the guiders: Foundations of a market-driven theory of disclosure
- Persuasion in networks: public signals and cores
- Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
- Censorship as optimal persuasion
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Derandomization of persuasion mechanisms
- Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
- Experiments versus distributions of posteriors
- Information design for selling search goods and the effect of competition
- Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: robust (Bayesian) persuasion
- Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification
- The persuasion duality
- Persuading large investors
- Adversarial coordination and public information design
- Information and policing
- Persuasion meets delegation
- Optimal discriminatory disclosure
- Information design with endogenous state verification
- Persuasion without priors
- Optimal mechanisms for selling market segmentation
- Buyer-optimal extensionproof information
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