Information design with endogenous state verification

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2026.106182MaRDI QIDQ7286806zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Lily Ling Yang

Publication date 23 June 2026

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2026.106182

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
• Extreme points and majorization: economic applications
• Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
• Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Testing, disclosure and approval
• The interval structure of optimal disclosure

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