On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance

DOI10.1007/S00291-010-0220-5MaRDI QIDQ538488zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anja De Waegenaere, Jacco L. Wielhouwer

Publication date 25 May 2011

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-010-0220-5

zbMATH Keywords

compensationoptimal contractprincipal-agent modelreporting flexibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Recommendations

• Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
• Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
• Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• A variational approach to contracting under imperfect observations

Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures

Cited in

(3)

• Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
• Discretion in managerial bonus pools
• Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies

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