Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90284-6zbMATH Open0825.90319OpenAlexW2030057412WikidataQ126470796 ScholiaQ126470796MaRDI QIDQ1206348FDOQ1206348

Authors: Anil Arya, Richard A. Young, Peter Woodlock 

Publication date: 1 April 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90284-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites Work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems

Cited In (1)

• On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance

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