Managerial reporting discretion and the truthfulness of disclosures

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90284-6MaRDI QIDQ1206348zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Richard A. Young, Peter Woodlock

Publication date 1 April 1993

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90284-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99)

Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information

Cited in

(1)

• On the effects of the degree of discretion in reporting managerial performance

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