A paradox of expert rights in abstract argumentation

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1136-2zbMath1410.91207OpenAlexW2810401556MaRDI QIDQ2417385

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 12 June 2019

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1136-2

zbMATH Keywords

preference aggregationjudgement aggregationabstract argumentationliberal paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Preservation of semantic properties in collective argumentation: the case of aggregating abstract argumentation frameworks

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