Dynamic learning and strategic communication

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0474-XMaRDI QIDQ328555zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Maxim Ivanov

Publication date 20 October 2016

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0474-x

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcheap talkinformation acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Communication and learning
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
• Persuasion and dynamic communication
• A model for dynamic communicators
• The strategic role of nonbinding communication
• Dynamic communication mechanism design
• The effective communication of system dynamics to improve insight and learning in management education

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1300860 (Why is no real title available?)
• A model of expertise
• A two-person game of information transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Dynamic strategic information transmission
• Information revelation in competitive markets
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Informational control and organizational design
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Optimal Delegation
• Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• Stochastic orders
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Will truth out? -- An advisor's quest to appear competent

Cited in

(12)

• Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Perfect robust implementation by private information design
• The effective communication of system dynamics to improve insight and learning in management education
• Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
• Professional advice
• Cheap talk with private signal structures
• Communication and learning
• Communication via a strategic mediator
• When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

This page was built for publication: Dynamic learning and strategic communication

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q328555)