Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0184MaRDI QIDQ2099084zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Haoran Lei, Xiaojian Zhao

Publication date 22 November 2022

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0184

zbMATH Keywords

delegationfinancial adviceunawarenessunforeseen contingencies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Recommendations

• Incentives for unaware agents
• Information structures with unawareness
• Disclosure and choice
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Communication breakdown: consultation or delegation from an expert with uncertain bias

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• Framing contingencies in contracts
• Incentives for unaware agents
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Multi-task agency with unawareness
• Optimal Delegation
• Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
• The theory of optimal delegation with an application to tariff caps
• Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers

Cited in

(4)

• Delegated contracting, information, and internal control
• Introduction to the special issue on unawareness
• Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
• Strategic information suppression in borrowing and pre-lending cognition: theory and evidence

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