Incentives for unaware agents

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDR050MaRDI QIDQ4610545zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao

Publication date 23 January 2019

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr050

zbMATH Keywords

screeningmoral hazardunawarenessincomplete contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cited in

(20)

• Dynamic awareness and strategic adaptation in cybersecurity: a game-theory approach
• Strategic information suppression in borrowing and pre-lending cognition: theory and evidence
• Vertically differentiated duopoly with unaware consumers
• Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result
• Guessing the game: an individual's awareness and assessment of a game's existence
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Games with unawareness
• Introspective unawareness and observable choice
• Payoff implications of incentive contracting
• Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
• Implicit knowledge in unawareness structures
• Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
• Framing contingencies in contracts
• Contract design with socially attentive preferences
• Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
• Multi-task agency with unawareness
• Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness
• Ignorance in agency problems
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment

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