Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103145MaRDI QIDQ6940370zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Leonidas Enrique de la Rosa, Nikolaj Niebuhr Lambertsen

Publication date 19 August 2025

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103145

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentmoral hazardoverconfidencerenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
• Incentives for unaware agents
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Multi-task agency with unawareness
• On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships
• Overconfidence and moral hazard
• Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
• Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Worker overconfidence: Field evidence and implications for employee turnover and firm profits

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