Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
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Publication:5087349
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- Book Review: Contract theory in continuous-time models
- The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms*
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
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- Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making
- Overconfidence and moral hazard without commitment
- Robust personal equilibrium effects in misspecified causal models
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