Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00425MaRDI QIDQ5472968zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael D. Whinston, I. R. Segal'

Publication date 19 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38668

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Contracting with Externalities
• Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: a framework for robust predictions
• Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Contractual stability and competitive equilibrium in a pure exchange economy
• Contractual stability and competitive equilibrium in a pure exchange economy
• Stable outcomes for two-sided contract choice problems

Cited in

(25)

• Contracting with externalities and outside options
• On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
• Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities
• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• Contractible contracts in common agency problems
• On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting
• Contracts and externalities: how things fall apart
• Optional fixed fees in multilateral vertical relations
• Output shares in bilateral agency contracts
• Multilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information
• Testing passive versus symmetric beliefs in contracting with externalities
• Menu contracts and the division of profits in vertical relationships
• Multilateral externalities: contracts with private information either about costs or benefits
• The inefficiency of price quantity bargaining
• Optimal contracting in networks
• Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
• Moral hazard with excess returns
• Reciprocal contracting
• Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria
• Games played in a contracting environment
• The non-existence of pairwise-proof equilibrium
• The strategically ignorant principal

This page was built for publication: Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5472968)