Stable outcomes for two-sided contract choice problems

DOI10.1007/S10588-005-6284-0MaRDI QIDQ812399zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Somdeb Lahiri

Publication date 23 January 2006

Published in Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0406051

zbMATH Keywords

contract choicematchingstable outcomestwo-sidedWeakly Pareto Optimal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeild outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly Pareto Optimal for firms. Under additional assumptions: (a) given any two distinct workers, the set of yields acheivable by a firm with the first worker is disjoint from the set of yields acheivable by it with the second, and (b) the contract choice problem is pair-wise efficient, we prove that there is no stable outcome at which a firm can get more than what it gets at the unique outcome of our procedure.

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Cites work

• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models

Cited in

(3)

• Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
• Stable outcomes for contract choice problems
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

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