Stable and meta-stable contract networks
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6051063
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102888zbMath1522.91166arXiv2202.13089MaRDI QIDQ6051063
Alexander V. Karzanov, Vladimir I. Danilov
Publication date: 19 September 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.13089
hypergraphstable marriageroommate problemAizerman-Malishevski theoremPlott choice functionsscarf lemma
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