Stable and meta-stable contract networks

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102888zbMath1522.91166arXiv2202.13089MaRDI QIDQ6051063

Alexander V. Karzanov, Vladimir I. Danilov

Publication date: 19 September 2023

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.13089

zbMATH Keywords

hypergraphstable marriageroommate problemAizerman-Malishevski theoremPlott choice functionsscarf lemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

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