The stable roommates problem with choice functions

DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9314-3zbMath1209.68368MaRDI QIDQ1959722

Tamás Fleiner

Publication date: 7 October 2010

Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9314-3

zbMATH Keywords

choice function; stable roommates problem; stable matching; Irving's algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

68R05: Combinatorics in computer science

05A05: Permutations, words, matrices

68R10: Graph theory (including graph drawing) in computer science

Related Items

Matroidal Choice Functions, Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems, Stable and meta-stable contract networks

Cites Work

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