Coercion, contract and the limits of the market
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Publication:2464040
DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0245-0zbMATH Open1180.91176OpenAlexW3124879457MaRDI QIDQ2464040FDOQ2464040
Authors: Kaushik Basu 
Publication date: 10 December 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/06-01.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Aggregating Infinite Utility Streams with InterGenerational Equity: The Impossibility of Being Paretian
- Intransitive Indifference in Preference Theory: A Survey
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A note in magneto-hydrodynamics of a finite rotating disk
- Group rationality, utilitarianism, and Escher's waterfall
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