Coercion, contract and the limits of the market

DOI10.1007/S00355-007-0245-0MaRDI QIDQ2464040zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kaushik Basu

Publication date 10 December 2007

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cae.economics.cornell.edu/06-01.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3453898 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note in magneto-hydrodynamics of a finite rotating disk
• Aggregating Infinite Utility Streams with InterGenerational Equity: The Impossibility of Being Paretian
• Group rationality, utilitarianism, and Escher's waterfall
• Intransitive Indifference in Preference Theory: A Survey

Cited in

(1)

• Nash equilibria of games when players' preferences are quasi-transitive

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