Multi-task agency with unawareness
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Publication:490055
DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9397-9zbMATH Open1304.91148OpenAlexW3125454880MaRDI QIDQ490055FDOQ490055
Authors: Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao 
Publication date: 21 January 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9397-9
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Cites Work
- Incomplete contracts and complexity costs
- Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Extensive games with possibly unaware players
- Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
- Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
- Satisficing contracts
- Incentives for unaware agents
- Costly Contract Contingencies
- Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
- Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
Cited In (8)
- Incentives for unaware agents
- Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
- Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
- Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
- Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
- Uncertain agency models with multi-dimensional incomplete information based on confidence level
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