Multi-task agency with unawareness

DOI10.1007/S11238-013-9397-9MaRDI QIDQ490055zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao

Publication date 21 January 2015

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9397-9

zbMATH Keywords

screeningmoral hazardunawarenessincomplete contractsmulti-task agency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Recommendations

• Incentives for unaware agents
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
• Multitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Costly Contract Contingencies
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
• Incentives for unaware agents
• Incomplete contracts and complexity costs
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Satisficing contracts
• Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia, and information suppression in competitive markets

Cited in

(8)

• Incentives for unaware agents
• Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
• Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard
• Solution concepts of principal-agent models with unawareness of actions
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
• Delegation and information disclosure with unforeseen contingencies
• Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
• Uncertain agency models with multi-dimensional incomplete information based on confidence level

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