Payoff implications of incentive contracting

DOI10.3982/TE4293MaRDI QIDQ3390543zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel F. Garrett

Publication date 24 March 2022

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4293

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmechanism designprocurementrobustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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(12)

• Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts
• Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
• Dynamic incentive contracts in multiple penalty systems with no-commitment to tenure-track auditing
• Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
• Incentives and Transactions Costs Within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records
• Stochastic Dominance of Pension Plans
• Can agents be better off with pay caps?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5260276 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal technology design
• A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
• Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives
• Information orders in screening problems

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