Calibrated incentive contracts
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- Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
- Transferable deposits as a screening mechanism
- A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability
- Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
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- Optimal compensation with adverse selection and dynamic actions
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Robust contracting with additive noise
- Payoff implications of incentive contracting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5307775 (Why is no real title available?)
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2094761 (Why is no real title available?)
- Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets
- Optimal contracts with shirking
- Weighted utility optimization of the participating endowment contract
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
- Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications
- Persuasion with unknown beliefs
- Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
- Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option
- Robust incentives for risk
- Robust contracting under double moral hazard
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Efficient Resource Allocation Contracts to Reduce Adverse Events
- Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
- Data-driven contract design
- Robust performance evaluation of independent agents
- Implementing deterministic outcomes in stochastic dynamic environments
- Optimal long-term contract for fertilizer supply under farmer's dynamic private information
- Information orders in screening problems
- Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system
- Scale effects in dynamic contracting
- Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
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