Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9327-2zbMATH Open1282.91177OpenAlexW2052567345MaRDI QIDQ1936337FDOQ1936337

Authors: Josepa Miquel-Florensa 

Publication date: 4 February 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9327-2

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddynamic contractsSamaritan dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic dynamics (91B55) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Cites Work

• On the Differentiability of the Value Function in Dynamic Models of Economics
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Discounted Dynamic Programming
• The middle class consensus and economic development
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts
• Optimal unemployment insurance and employment history

Cited In (1)

• Project contracting strategies for managing team dynamics

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