Efficient Resource Allocation Contracts to Reduce Adverse Events

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2022.2322MaRDI QIDQ6195085zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors

Publication date 12 March 2024

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/0bcf44d9-d0ac-4231-beaf-8c21ce347847

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic contract designmoral hazardplatform economyself-generating setstochastic optimal control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical programming (90Cxx)

Recommendations

• Dynamic contracting: accidents lead to nonlinear contracts
• Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
• Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Calibrated incentive contracts

Cited in

(2)

• Agency contracts with incentive mechanisms considering supplier risk aversion in a dynamic platform supply chain
• Information design for social learning on a recommendation platform

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