Robust contracting under double moral hazard

DOI10.3982/TE4916MaRDI QIDQ6180418zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabriel Carroll

Publication date 19 January 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4916

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdouble-sided moral hazardlinear contractsprincipal-agent modelrobustnessuncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Calibrated incentive contracts
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
• Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Optimal shared-savings contracts in supply chains: linear contracts and double moral hazard
• Shared-savings contracts for indirect materials in supply chains: channel profits and environmental impacts

Cited in

(3)

• Simple contracts with double-sided moral hazard and adverse selection
• A general framework for robust contracting models
• Robustly optimal voting rule

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