Information transmission and inefficient lobbying

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.010zbMATH Open1296.91226OpenAlexW2119790577MaRDI QIDQ2016239FDOQ2016239

Authors: Rafael Costa Lima, Humberto Moreira 

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.010

Recommendations

• Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
• Transparency and special interests
• To invite or not to invite a lobby, that is the question

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationpolitical economycommon agencylobby

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Mathematical economics (91B99) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• A model of expertise
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
• Common Agency
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote

Cited In (5)

• Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
• Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Information exchange through secret vertical contracts
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure

This page was built for publication: Information transmission and inefficient lobbying

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2016239)