Information transmission and inefficient lobbying

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.02.010MaRDI QIDQ2016239zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rafael Costa Lima, Humberto Moreira

Publication date 19 June 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationpolitical economycommon agencylobby

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Mathematical economics (91B99) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Trade models (91B60)

Recommendations

• Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
• Transparency and special interests
• To invite or not to invite a lobby, that is the question

Cites work

• A model of expertise
• Common Agency
• Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information
• Competitive lobbying for a legislator's vote
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

Cited in

(7)

• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• Information exchange through secret vertical contracts
• Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals
• Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
• Centralized policymaking and informational lobbying
• Lobbying Game between the Government with Private Information and the Lobbyist

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