Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information

DOI10.3982/TE507zbMath1203.91084OpenAlexW1520619070MaRDI QIDQ4932240

Humberto Moreira, David Martimort

Publication date: 1 October 2010

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te507

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationpublic goodscommon agencyex post and interim efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing ⋮ Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals ⋮ Complementarity and information in collective action ⋮ Technical Note—Nonlinear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information ⋮ Information transmission and inefficient lobbying ⋮ Selecting equilibria in common agency games

Uses Software

• AEGIS

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