To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question

DOI10.1515/bejte-2014-0022zbMath1375.91201OpenAlexW2084951916MaRDI QIDQ4588469

Martin Gregor

Publication date: 26 October 2017

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0022

zbMATH Keywords

attentionlobbyinghard evidencedisclosureaccess fee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91B99) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic argumentation
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics

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