On selecting the right agent

DOI10.3982/TE4027zbMath1475.91159OpenAlexW3158203199MaRDI QIDQ5164460

Kfir Eliaz, Kareen Rozen, Daniel Fershtman, Geoffroy de Clippel

Publication date: 11 November 2021

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te4027

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic allocation without transfersrepeated games with imperfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (2)

Dynamic delegation with a persistent state ⋮ Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints

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