Learning optimal contracts with small action spaces

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2025.104334MaRDI QIDQ6977000zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti, Alberto Marchesi

Publication date 30 May 2025

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ARTINT.2025.104334

zbMATH Keywords

contract designonline learningprincipal-agent problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites work

• 2021 IEEE 62nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)
• Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
• Bayesian agency: linear versus tractable contracts
• Combinatorial contracts beyond Gross substitutes
• Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization
• Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
• Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to
• Learning approximately optimal contracts
• Microeconomic theory
• Multi-agent contracts
• No-regret learning in dynamic Stackelberg games
• On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
• The complexity of contracts

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