Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23MaRDI QIDQ3648861zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala

Publication date 1 December 2009

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04645-2_23

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited in

(9)

• A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
• Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy
• Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models
• Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment
• Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: an extended study
• Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
• Stackelberg security games with contagious attacks on a network: reallocation to the rescue
• Optimal private payoff manipulation against commitment in extensive-form games
• Learning optimal contracts with small action spaces

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