Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment
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Abstract: In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and learn her distribution over actions, before acting himself. If the actions were not observable, Nash (or perhaps correlated) equilibrium would arguably be a more natural solution concept. But what if some, but not all, aspects of the defender's actions are observable? In this paper, we introduce solution concepts corresponding to this case, both with and without correlation. We study their basic properties, whether these solutions can be efficiently computed, and the impact of additional observability on the utility obtained.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- Leadership games with convex strategy sets
- Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to
- Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
- New complexity results about Nash equilibria
- On the Value of Correlation
- Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
- Settling the complexity of computing two-player Nash equilibria
- Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: an extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Cited in
(5)- The Stackelberg equilibrium for one-sided zero-sum partially observable stochastic games
- Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders
- Stackelberg vs. Nash in security games: an extended investigation of interchangeability, equivalence, and uniqueness
- Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to
- Partnership with partial commitment: A game theoretic approach
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