Computing equilibria in discounted dynamic games

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2015.07.068zbMATH Open1410.91099OpenAlexW2215115254MaRDI QIDQ668745FDOQ668745

Authors: Andriy Burkov, Brahim Chaib-draa 

Publication date: 19 March 2019

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2015.07.068

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryautomatonrepeated gamesstochastic gamesMarkov chain gamessubgame-perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

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Cited In (9)

• Computing Stable Outcomes in Hedonic Games
• The complexity of infinitely repeated alternating move games
• Ruling out multiplicity of smooth equilibria in dynamic games: a hyperbolic discounting example
• Computing Equilibria of Dynamic Games
• Not just an empty threat: subgame-perfect equilibrium in repeated games played by computationally bounded players
• Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment
• Computing equilibria in dynamic models with occasionally binding constraints
• On the equilibria of alternating move games
• A distributed algorithm to obtain repeated games equilibria with discounting

Uses Software

• CPLEX
• OptimJ

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