A belief-based evolutionarily stable strategy
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Publication:485658
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.07.009zbMATH Open1302.91024arXiv1406.0045OpenAlexW2963979004WikidataQ51067803 ScholiaQ51067803MaRDI QIDQ485658FDOQ485658
Sankaran Mahadevan, Yong Deng, Zhen Wang, Xinyang Deng, Qi Liu
Publication date: 13 January 2015
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: As an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory and has attracted growing interest. An ESS can be either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy. Even though the randomness is allowed in mixed strategy, the selection probability of pure strategy in a mixed strategy may fluctuate due to the impact of many factors. The fluctuation can lead to more uncertainty. In this paper, such uncertainty involved in mixed strategy has been further taken into consideration: a belief strategy is proposed in terms of Dempster-Shafer evidence theory. Furthermore, based on the proposed belief strategy, a belief-based ESS has been developed. The belief strategy and belief-based ESS can reduce to the mixed strategy and mixed ESS, which provide more realistic and powerful tools to describe interactions among agents.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.0045
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