Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: an extended study
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Cites work
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- Improving resource allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: an extended study
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- Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
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- Separating curvature and elevation: a parametric probability weighting function
- The Probability Weighting Function
Cited in
(4)- Improving resource allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: an extended study
- Addressing scalability and robustness in security games with multiple boundedly rational adversaries
- Dynamic games in cyber-physical security: an overview
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