A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games
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Publication:1190232
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-TzbMath0756.90104OpenAlexW2064140805MaRDI QIDQ1190232
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-t
Related Items (5)
Developing real option game models ⋮ Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games ⋮ Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory ⋮ Continuous-time games of timing ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
Cites Work
- Limit games and limit equilibria
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Theory of functional differential equations. 2nd ed
- Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
- Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
- On Adjustment Costs and the Stability of Equilibria
- Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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