A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-TzbMATH Open0756.90104OpenAlexW2064140805MaRDI QIDQ1190232FDOQ1190232

James Bergin

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-t

Recommendations

• Continuous Time Repeated Games
• Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games
• An extension of the ``folk theorem with continuous reaction functions
• On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriacontinuous time repeated gamesvariable response strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Theory of functional differential equations. 2nd ed
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• On Adjustment Costs and the Stability of Equilibria

Cited In (7)

• Developing real option game models
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Continuous-time games of timing
• Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: an extended study
• Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory
• Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games
• Iterated games and arms race models

This page was built for publication: A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1190232)