A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-TzbMath0756.90104OpenAlexW2064140805MaRDI QIDQ1190232

James Bergin

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-t

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriacontinuous time repeated gamesvariable response strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Developing real option game models ⋮ Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games ⋮ Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory ⋮ Continuous-time games of timing ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations

Cites Work

• Limit games and limit equilibria
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Theory of functional differential equations. 2nd ed
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• On Adjustment Costs and the Stability of Equilibria
• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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