A model of strategic behaviour in repeated games

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-TMaRDI QIDQ1190232zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James Bergin

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(92)90007-t

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriacontinuous time repeated gamesvariable response strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Continuous Time Repeated Games
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Cites work

• Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• On Adjustment Costs and the Stability of Equilibria
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Theory of functional differential equations. 2nd ed

Cited in

(10)

• Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory
• Continuity, inertia, and strategic uncertainty: a test of the theory of continuous time games
• Iterated games and arms race models
• On the strategic equivalence of linear dynamic and repeated games
• Trigger strategy equilibriums in stochastic differential games with information time lags: an analysis of cooperative production strategies
• Repeated games in continuous time as extensive form games
• Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: an extended study
• Continuous-time games of timing
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• Developing real option game models

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