Comparing human behavior models in repeated Stackelberg security games: an extended study
DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2016.08.002zbMATH Open1390.91079OpenAlexW2514333820MaRDI QIDQ329050FDOQ329050
Authors: Debarun Kar, Fei Fang, Francesco M. Delle Fave, Nicole Sintov, Milind Tambe, Arnaud Lyet 
Publication date: 21 October 2016
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2016.08.002
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Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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Cited In (4)
- Addressing scalability and robustness in security games with multiple boundedly rational adversaries
- Dynamic games in cyber-physical security: an overview
- Improving resource allocation strategies against human adversaries in security games: an extended study
- Robust solutions to Stackelberg games: addressing bounded rationality and limited observations in human cognition
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