On the Strategic Equivalence of Linear Dynamic and Repeated Games

DOI10.1142/S0219198915500061zbMath1331.91044MaRDI QIDQ3459196

Joachim Hubmer

Publication date: 21 December 2015

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesrepeated gamesstochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes

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