Ambiguous contracts

DOI10.3982/ECTA22687MaRDI QIDQ6979527zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz, Larry Samuelson

Publication date 25 May 2025

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversionmoral hazardcontract designhidden actionprincipal-agent modelambiguous contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A general framework for robust contracting models
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• Ambiguous contracts
• Ambiguous persuasion
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
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• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
• Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Randomization and ambiguity aversion
• Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• Robust Incentives for Teams
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• The complexity of contracts
• The design of ambiguous mechanisms
• Updating ambiguous beliefs

Cited in

(2)

• Ambiguous contracts
• Algorithmic contract theory: a survey

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