Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
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(69)- Mutually acceptable courses of action
- Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule
- The revelation approach to Nash implementation
- The interaction of implicit and explicit contracts in repeated agency
- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
- Incomplete contracts and complexity costs
- Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
- Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
- Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
- Customized transportation, equity participation, and cooperation performance within logistics supply chains
- The negotiators who knew too much: transaction costs and incomplete information
- Holdups and holdouts: what do they have in common?
- Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment
- The management of innovation: experimental evidence
- Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty
- Incomplete contracts versus communication
- Theory of quantum games and quantum economic behavior
- Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts
- Co-investment deterrence
- Coordination of collective actions by using the Stackelberg strategy
- On efficient firm formation
- Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
- The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
- Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
- Efficient investment through renegotiation of simple contracts
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Optimal limited authority for principal
- Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat
- Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
- Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment
- Contractual incompleteness for external risks
- Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
- INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
- Land Tenancy and Non-Contractible Investment in Rural Pakistan
- Satisficing contracts
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
- Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure
- The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting
- Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
- Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
- Markets and contracts
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: results on the technology of trade and investment
- Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
- Incomplete contract, transaction-specific investment, and bargaining power
- Costly Contract Contingencies
- Ex ante contracting with endogenously determined communication plans
- The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
- Contractual flexibility, firm effort, and subsidy design: a comparison of PPP project contracts
- Disclosing products' freshness level as a non-contractible quality: optimal logistics service contracts in the fresh products supply chain
- ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
- The cost of appropriation and firm boundaries
- Incomplete contracts with disparity, uncertainty, information and incentives
- Ambiguous contracts
- Algorithmic contract theory: a survey
- Evidence disclosure and verifiability
- A Nobel Prize for property rights theory
- The hold-up problem with flexible unobservable investments
- Hold-up in the absence of individual rationality: asymptotic efficiency and gradualism
- Holdup and innovation
- Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
- Hard evidence and mechanism design
- The optimal design of rewards in contests
- Contract adjustment under uncertainty
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