After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
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Publication:1279614
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0597zbMath0915.90013OpenAlexW2009448676MaRDI QIDQ1279614
Publication date: 16 February 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0597
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Related Items (4)
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information ⋮ Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework ⋮ Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances. ⋮ Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
Cites Work
- Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
- Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
- Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting
- Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
- Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
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