The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting

DOI10.2307/3440580zbMATH Open0914.90085OpenAlexW1521428310MaRDI QIDQ4223363FDOQ4223363

Authors: Dieter Bös, Christoph Lülfesmann 

Publication date: 3 January 1999

Published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/3440580

Recommendations

• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts

zbMATH Keywords

renegotiationoptimal contractstwo-period procurement model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (1)

• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment

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