Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure

DOI10.1007/S00712-011-0258-0MaRDI QIDQ405779zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Te Bao, Yongqin Wang

Publication date 5 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0258-0

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdivisional structureincomplete contractorganizational design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

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Cites work

• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
• Leadership Style and Incentives
• Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents
• Task assignment and organizational form
• The Firm as a Communication Network
• The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation.

Cited in

(1)

• Diversification or splitting -- an explanation based on contract theory

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