Contractual flexibility, firm effort, and subsidy design: a comparison of PPP project contracts

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2022.09.018MaRDI QIDQ6107003zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Zhuo Feng, Jinbo Song, Xiaoxing Yang, Ran Guo

Publication date 3 July 2023

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.EJOR.2022.09.018

zbMATH Keywords

flexible contractgovernment subsidiesPPPproject managementrigid contract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

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Cites work

• Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Sharing risk through concession contracts

Cited in

(1)

• An analysis of information disclosure in build-operate-transfer road projects

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