How to design infrastructure contracts in a warming world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships
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Publication:2802708
Recommendations
- Contractual efficiency of PPP infrastructure projects: an incomplete contract model
- Sustainable and optimal ``uniqueness contract in public-private partnership projects of transportation infrastructure
- Climate contracts: a game of emissions, investments, negotiations, and renegotiations
- Agency problems in public-private partnerships investment projects
- Cost allocation in PPP projects: an analysis based on the theory of ``contracts as reference points
Cites work
- How to design infrastructure contracts in a warming world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships
- Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly
- The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts
Cited in
(6)- Public procurement in times of crisis: the bundling decision reconsidered
- Sustainable and optimal ``uniqueness contract in public-private partnership projects of transportation infrastructure
- Contractual efficiency of PPP infrastructure projects: an incomplete contract model
- Contractual flexibility, firm effort, and subsidy design: a comparison of PPP project contracts
- Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: punishment or rent extraction?
- How to design infrastructure contracts in a warming world: a critical appraisal of public-private partnerships
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