Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations
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Publication:4610562
DOI10.1093/restud/rds011zbMath1405.91053OpenAlexW3121859133MaRDI QIDQ4610562
Publication date: 23 January 2019
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds011
incomplete contractsdynamic gamesclimate changeenvironmental agreementshold-up problemsrenegotiation design
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)
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