Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(56)- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
- Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity
- Game-theoretic modeling of players' ambiguities on external factors
- Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
- Final-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties
- Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
- Modes of ambiguous communication
- Maxmin implementation
- Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
- Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
- Robust pricing under strategic trading
- Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- Reacting to ambiguous messages: an experimental analysis
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Dynamic semi-consistency
- Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: a reappraisal
- Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility
- Zero-sum games with ambiguity
- Purification and disambiguation of Ellsberg equilibria
- The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation
- Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models
- Public goods with ambiguity in large economies
- Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion
- Relative maximum likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs
- Ambiguous information and dilation: an experiment
- Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
- The design of ambiguous mechanisms
- Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- Mechanism design and communication networks
- Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
- Contextual mechanism design
- Implementation under ambiguity
- Mechanism design with model specification
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Beyond uncertainty aversion
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
- Ambiguity and partial Bayesian updating
- Informativeness orders over ambiguous experiments
- Strategic ambiguity in global games
- Robust auctions with affiliated private values
- Ambiguous contracts
- Information aggregation under ambiguity: theory and experimental evidence
- Benefits and challenges of ambiguous product information
- Equilibrium theory under ambiguity
- Mechanism design and bounded rationality: the case of type misreporting
This page was built for publication: Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4615891)
