Robust auctions with affiliated private values
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Cites work
- A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
- A rule for updating ambiguous beliefs
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
- Ambiguity, Risk, and Asset Returns in Continuous Time
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study
- Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
- Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
- Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53178 (Why is no real title available?)
- IID: Independently and indistinguishably distributed.
- Intertemporal Asset Pricing under Knightian Uncertainty
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions
- Public goods with ambiguity in large economies
- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
- Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
- Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
- Search and Knightian uncertainty
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
- The design of ambiguous mechanisms
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
- Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium
- Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
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