Robust auctions with affiliated private values

DOI10.1007/S10058-024-00354-0MaRDI QIDQ6956264zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Yangwei Song

Publication date 18 July 2025

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10058-024-00354-0

zbMATH Keywords

affiliationambiguity aversionlinkage principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

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