Mechanism design with model specification

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01449-3MaRDI QIDQ6051888zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pathikrit Basu

Publication date 20 September 2023

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01449-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Active learning with a misspecified prior
• An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. With contributions by Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Sellers with misspecified models
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games

Cited in

(6)

• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• On the equivalence of optimal mechanisms with loss and disappointment aversion
• Mechanism design and intentions
• Sellers with misspecified models
• Contextual mechanism design
• Mechanism design by observant and informed planners

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